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Abstract
Recent empirical studies reveal that eﬀectiveness of aid on growth is ambiguous.
This paper considers aid proliferation - excess aid investment relative to recurrent
cost - as a potential cause that undermines aid eﬀectiveness, because aid projects can
only produce sustainable beneﬁts when suﬃcient recurrent costs are disbursed. We
consider the donor’s budget support as a device to supplement the shortage of the
recipient’s recurrent cost and to alleviate the misallocation of inputs. However, when
donors have self-interested preferences over the success of their own projects to those
conducted by others, they provide insuﬃcient budget support relative to aid which
results in aid proliferation. Moreover, aid proliferation is shown to be worsened by
the presence of more donors.
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 1 Introduction
There is a growing debate on whether aid is eﬀective for development and growth (World
Bank, 1998; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007). Numerous empirical studies using cross-
country panel data has been conducted but aid eﬀectiveness is found to be fragile (Rood-
man, 2007; Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). Why is aid not so eﬀective as expected? A
well-known but recently criticized thesis is that lack of good policy undermines aid eﬀec-
tiveness. World Bank (1998) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) argues that aid promotes
growth only when it is associated with good policy. However, their empirical evidence
based on cross-country growth regression analysis has been found to be fragile (Easterly et
al., 2004; Roodman, 2007).
An alternative possible cause of aid ineﬀectiveness is aid proliferation, fragmentation,
and bombardment1, that is, too many donors and aid projects relative to recipient’s ab-
sorption capacity (Morss, 1984; World Bank, 2001). There are several channels in which
aid proliferation can harm aid eﬀectiveness. Recent studies indicate that aid proliferation
increases transaction costs and depreciate the real amount of aid (Acharya et al., 2006).
Aid proliferation can also induce a version of “tragedy of the commons”: donors compete
and scramble for a common-pool-resource of “complementary domestic resources (Cassen,
1994, p.176)” such as recurrent cost, or foreign exchange (Br¨ autigam, 2000; Br¨ autigam and
Knack, 2004; Svensson, 2005; Knack and Rahman, 2007). Kimura et al. (2007) includes
donor-concentration index as an explanatory variable in the cross-country aid-growth re-
gression and ﬁnds that aid proliferation involves a negative eﬀect on on economic growth.
Local recurrent costs are important for aid eﬀectiveness since it is essential for sustaining
aid projects and producing eﬀects in the long run (Heller, 1974, 1979; Agbonyitor, 1998).
According to Hood et al. (2002), the ratios of annual recurrent expenditure to investment
expenditure of World Bank projects ranges from 0.003 to 0.074 depending on the sector,
with an average of 0.03. However, recipient countries often fail to cover such costs and the
consequence is: “roads and public utilities are in disrepair, schools are without teachers
or supplies, and vehicles for health and agricultural extension are without spare parts or
fuel” (van de Walle and Johnston, 1996, p.62). While the percentage of World Bank’s
projects that has been rated “likely” or better to be resilient to future risk is improving2,
still 36.2% of the projects implemented in Africa are assessed to be unlikely to sustain its
beneﬁt in the future, partly due to lack of local funds (World Bank, 2006). The reasons
for the failure to cover recurrent cost is lack of recipient government’s ability to monitor
and control budget as well as that the required recurrent costs is too signiﬁcant relative
to government budgets (Hyden, 1983; van de Walle and Johnston, 1996), which could be
caused by uncoordinated competition of increased claimants over limited budget (Campos
1World Bank (2001) describes that aid bombardment syndrome is “apparent in countries where the
sheer volume of resources and numbers of donors, activities, and complex and inconsistent procedural
requirements overwhelm the government’s capacity to plan, budget, manage, monitor, and evaluate.”
(World Bank, 2001, p.15).
2The percentage of projects that has been rated “likely” or better to be resilient to future risk improved
from 55.8% in exit ﬁscal year 1990-2000 to 76.7% in 2001-2005 (World Bank, 2006, pp.56–57).
1and Pradhan, 1996; Wuyts, 1996).
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the implications of aid proliferation on aid
eﬀectiveness by focusing on recurrent costs. We consider aid proliferation as a situation in
which there is excess aid relative to recurrent cost and ask the following questions: Why
does aid proliferation occur? How can we resolve aid proliferation? To link the issue of
aid proliferation on recurrent cost with the debate on aid eﬀectiveness, we consider an
aid-growth production function where output (development or growth) is produced by aid
investment and recurrent cost. The potential ineﬃciency and ineﬀectiveness of aid on
growth is caused by misallocation of the inputs; aid might have been ineﬀective because
recurrent cost was not disbursed enough.
We show that aid proliferation occurs primary because the allocation of aid investment
and recurrent cost is uncoordinated. Since the amount of aid and recurrent cost is decided
by the donors and the recipient separately, and the opportunity costs are diﬀerent among
the parties, eﬃcient combination of the two inputs can only be achieved by chance. Thus
there is a need for a mechanism to coordinate the amount and allocation of aid and recurrent
cost. We consider programme aid or budget support as such mechanism, where part of aid
is allowed to be used for recurrent expenditure. We show that budget support can alleviate
misallocation of inputs when the donors are not self-biased so that each donor evaluates
the output from other donors and the recipient equally to her own project. However, when
the donors are self-biased, even a budget support can not fully resolve the misallocation of
inputs and in fact ends up with aid proliferation because budget support is underprovided.
We also show that aid proliferation is exaggerated with more self-biased donors, implying
that donor competition makes the problem worse.
The problem of common-pool-resources in the context of foreign aid as a donor compe-
tition over “complementary domestic resources” has been pioneered formally by Knack and
Rahman (2007), which analyzes the situation in which donors compete and poaches local
experts to their own aid projects and thus lowers bureaucratic quality of the recipient gov-
ernment. Roodman (2006) takes into account for both size and number of aid projects and
shows that selﬁsh donors who care most about the success of their own projects may have
an incentive to proliferate aid projects. Since we also consider the common-pool-resource
characteristics of the recipient’s recurrent cost, the essential nature of our model is the
same as these studies. The distinctive feature of ours is the focus on the implication of
budget support in which a donor can supplement the shortage of the recipient’s resources.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents the basic
setup of the model and discuss why optimal combination of aid and recurrent cost is not
achieved in general. Section 2 deals with budget support that supplements recurrent cost
and explains why such support may cause aid proliferation. Section 4 concludes.
22 The tragedy of the recurrent cost
2.1 Model
Consider N donors conducting an aid project in the recipient’s country. We consider donor
i’s aid project production function yi = fi(ai,xi) where ai is the amount of donor i’s aid
and xi is the amount of recurrent cost funded by the recipient to donor i’s aid project.
For example, in the case of a school project, yi would be educational attainment, ai is
the amount of investment to schools funded by donor i’s aid and xi is the teacher’s salary
paid from the recipient’s recurrent budget. For the educational attainment to be improved,
only schools without (motivated) teachers will do little, while good teachers without school
facilities would also undermine the potential eﬃciency of education. We also assume that
fax > 0, that is, aid investment and recurrent cost are complementary. In order to ensure
that the second order conditions of the maximization problems are satisﬁed, we assume
that faa > 0, fxx > 0 and faafxx − (fax)2 > 0.
The recipient allocates its recurrent budget among aid projects and its own domestic




i xi), where g repre-
sents a production function of the recipient’s own projects, K denotes the predetermined
capital level of the projects and X is the total recurrent budget size. One important as-
sumption is that the donors cannot force the recipient to pay a certain amount of recurrent
costs to their own project, thus they have to take into account the recipient’s best response
in determining the amounts of aid.
Donors are altruistic in the sense that they enjoy utility from the development of the
recipient. However, a donor may be biased and cares only for the output from its own
aid project fi(ai,xi), or may be unbiased and equally beneﬁt from the output from all
projects,
PN
j=1 fj(aj,xj) + g(K,X −
PN
j xj). By using λi ∈ [0,1] as a parameter of donor













where ci(ai) is a convex aid cost function.
If all the donors and the recipient cooperate with each other to pool all the resources





















j for all i ̸= j, (1)
which means that every project has the same marginal productivity equal to the marginal
cost of aid. For the purpose of the following discussion, we deﬁne two types of eﬃciency,
technical aid eﬃciency and resource allocative eﬃciency as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 Technical aid eﬃciency is achieved when fi
a = c′
i, that is, the marginal pro-





x = gx for all i ̸= j, that is, allocation of resources among the donors and
the recipient is optimal.
We consider the timing of the game as follows:
• t = 1: Each donor decides ai simultaneously.
• t = 2: The recipient determines (x1,...,xN) after observing (a1,...,aN).
For the simplicity, we ﬁrst consider the case of two donors. Since there is no informa-
tional asymmetry, we can solve the problem straightforwardly by backward induction. At





2(a2,x2) + g(K,X − x1 − x2)





x = gx, (2)
that is, the recurrent cost is allocated in order to equate the marginal productivity among
the donors’ projects and recipient’s domestic projects. This condition also means that the
amount of the recurrent cost allocated to donor i’s project is a function of both a1 and a2:
xi = xi(a1,a2).
Then we consider the problem of the donors at t = 1. Donor i maximizes its payoﬀ







j(aj,xj(a1,a2)) + g(K,X − x1(a1,a2),x2(a1,a2))
¤
− ci(ai).
The ﬁrst order condition and (2) imply that
f
i







i = 0. (3)
























By combining (3) and (4), donor i’s optimal aid investment is determined by
f
i







i = 0. (6)
The argument above suggests the following proposition.
4Proposition 1 (i) If a donor is self-biased, i.e., λi < 1, then the aid project is technically
ineﬃcient, i.e., fi
a ̸= c′
i. (ii) In general, resource allocative eﬃciency, fa = fi
x = fj
x = gx,
is not achieved even if the donors are not self-biased, λi = 1 for all i.
The ﬁrst part is implied by (6). Since fax > 0, it turns out that fi
a < c′
i, which implies
that a donor will overinvest aid relative to its marginal cost if λi < 1. When a donor
increases aid, it attracts the recurrent cost since the recipient has incentives to equate
the marginal productivity among the projects. An increase of recurrent cost for one donor
reduces that for other donors and hence, output of others’ projects decrease. When a donor
is self-biased, it weighs more on its own project than the negative externality on others. The
more self-biased the donor is, the more aid it disburses and the more technically ineﬃcient
its project becomes.
The second part says that although we have f1
x = f2
x = gx, fa ̸= fx is not guaranteed in
general even if the donors are not self-biased. This is because there is no mechanism that
optimizes the allocation of total resource
PN
i ai + X between investment and recurrent
cost since they are decided independently by the donors and recipient. In general, it is
not guaranteed that the donor’s opportunity cost of aid is equivalent to the recipient’s
opportunity cost of recurrent cost. Thus resource allocative ineﬃciency remains even if
the donors are not self-biased. However, when the donors are self-biased, they will tend
to disburse more aid. So there is more chance of having excess aid investment relative to
recurrent cost, resulting in aid proliferation.
Before proceeding, we note that we can easily extend the two donors model above to











If the aid production functions are identical among the donors, the above equation becomes
˜ M−i =
fxxgxx
fxx + (N − 1)gxx
< 0, (8)






xx+ ˜ M−i > 0 gets
larger, which leads to greater distortion: the donors further overinvest in the aid, resulting
in the further decrease in fi
a and greater gap between fi
a and ci. So an increase in the
number of donors leads to further technical aid ineﬃciency. This is caused by concavity
of the production functions fi. Suppose that donor i increases its aid ai. This induces the
recipient to increase xi by reducing the recurrent costs allocated to other donors and its
own. If there are only two donors, a dollar increase in x1 requires 1/2 dollar decreases of
recurrent costs for donor j’s and the recipient’s projects. On the other hand, if there are
20 donors, a dollar increase in xi can be covered by 1/20 dollar decreases of the recurrent
costs for each project (19 donors’ projects and the recipient’s project). The concavity of
the production functions implies that the 1/20 dollar decreases in 20 projects reduces total
output less than the 1/2 dollar decreases in two projects. Thus when there are more donors,





53 Mitigating aid proliferation with budget support
The argument in the previous section suggests that the eﬃcient combination of the donor’s
aid investment and the recipient’s recurrent cost (i.e., fi
x = fi
a) generally cannot be achieved.
In practice, since the recipient’s budget is generally small and unstable, it is feasible to
assume and focus on the case of aid proliferation, that is, fi
x determined by (2) is suﬃciently
higher than fi
a determined by (6) (i.e., fi
x > fi
a), so the recurrent cost is sparce relative to
aid investment.
In order to resolve such allocative ineﬃciency, we now allow the donors to disburse
part of the aid as budget support that can be used as a recurrent cost to supplement the
recipient’s budget3. This works as a device to adjust the resource allocation between aid
investment and recurrent cost. We consider two schemes of budget support: untied and
tied. Untied budget support by donor i is given to the recipients directly and its usage is
open to all donors’ projects as well as the recipient’s project. Conversely, the usage of tied
budget support is “tied” and restricted to the projects of the funding donor.
3.1 Untied budget support
Let bi denote the amount of budget support granted by donor i. Under the untied budget
support, the recipient’s total budget is X +
PN
i=1 bi. Here we explicitly deal with the case
of two donors for the simplicity of the notation, but it is ﬁrst necessary to change the
deﬁnition of Mj to M−i as in the previous section.





2(a2,x2) + g(K,X + b1 + b2 − x1 − x2).





x = gx. (9)





















j(aj,xj(ai,aj)) + λig(K,X + bi + bj − xi − xj) − ci(ai + bi).
The ﬁrst order conditions and (9) imply that
f
i







i = 0, and (12)
λif
i







i = 0. (13)
3It is often the case that program aid contains a recurrent cost component (Wuyts, 1996, p.731).
6Condition (12) along with equation (10) has a similar form to the case without budget
support in the previous section. But this does not mean that the equilibrium levels of the
aid in these two cases are identical. This is because fi
ax > 0, which implies that the level of
recurrent cost aﬀects the marginal productivity of the aid and hence the equilibrium amount
of aid. Since the donors can alleviate the recipient’s resource constraint by transferring their
money into the recipient’s budget in the case of budget support, the equilibrium level of
the recurrent cost will generally be diﬀerent from the case without budget support. The
equilibrium levels of the budget support and recurrent cost funded by the recipient are
characterized by (13) and (9), which we will elaborate more after analyzing the case of tied
budget support.
3.2 Tied budget support




1(a1,x1 + b1) + f
2(a2,x2 + b2) + g(K,X − x1 − x2)





x = gx (14)

















While the expression of
∂xi
∂ai is the same as in the case of untied budget support, that of
∂xi
∂bi is diﬀerent and has a negative sign. In the case of untied budget support, the money is
transferred to the recipient’s budget and then allocated to each project. Thus an increase
in bi expands the total resource available for all the projects as recurrent cost, resulting
in increase in both xi and xj, j ̸= i. On the other hand, if a donor provides tied budget
support which can be used only for its own project, then the recipient’s optimal behavior is
to reduce xi and allocate it to other projects in order to equate the marginal productivity
of the recurrent costs among each project. This is why the sign of
∂xi
∂bi in the case of tied
budget support is opposite to that in the case of untied budget support.




i(ai,xi(ai,aj) + bi) + λif
j(aj,xj(ai,aj) + bj) + λig(K,X − xi − xj) − ci(ai + bi),
and the ﬁrst order conditions and (14) imply
f
i







i = 0, and (17)
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i = 0. (18)
7Notice that the donor i’s ﬁrst order conditions with respect to ai (12) and (17) are
identical. The ﬁrst order conditions with respect to bi (13) and (18) also turn out to be
identical since after substituting
∂xi













i = 0. (19)
This establishes the proof of equivalence of untied budget support and tied budget support.
Proposition 2 Untied budget support and tied budget support generate the equivalent out-
comes.
This result is due to fungibility of the recurrent budget X. Even if the usage of budget
support is tied to a particular donor’s project, the recipient can adjust the allocation of its
own budget X between the recurrent cost of that project and other donors’ projects as well
as its own project in order to equate the marginal productivity of the recipient’s recurrent
cost among all projects. Provided the equivalence result between two budget support
schemes, we henceforth make our argument based on the case of tied budget support.
The donor’s ﬁrst order conditions (17) and (18) imply that if the donors are not self-
biased, λi = 1 for all i, then fi
a = fi
x = gx = c′
i for all i: both the technical eﬃciency and
resource allocative eﬃciency is achieved. So budget support can potentially resolve aid
proliferation and improve its eﬀectiveness.
Proposition 3 If a donor is not self-biased, then both technical and resource allocative
eﬃciency are achieved with budget support.
However, if a donor is self-biased, λi < 1, then these eﬃciencies are not achieved in
general. As for technical ineﬃciency, it is straightforward from the ﬁrst order condition of
(17) that aid is overinvested relative to its marginal cost. On the other hand, comparison




∂bi are identical, then the resource allocative
eﬃciency, fi
a = fi
x, is achieved. But this cannot be the case since
∂xi
∂ai > 0 while
∂xi
∂bi < 0
under the tied budget support scheme. Thus we obtain fi
a < ci < fi
x, which implies that the
aid is excessive relative to the recurrent cost. Also, from (8), we can see that an increase




∂bi, further exacerbating technical
ineﬃciency and resource allocative ineﬃciency.
Proposition 4 If a donor is self-biased, then there is aid proliferation even with budget
support. Aid proliferation gets worse if a donor is more self-biased (i.e., smaller λi) and if
there are more donors.
There will be more aid and less budget support under these two conditions. This is because
the donor’s budget support crowds out the recipient’s recurrent budget, i.e.,
∂xi
∂bi < 0 in the
case of tied budget support. If donor i is not self-biased, then it fully accounts for the
increased outputs of other donors’ and recipient’s project so its incentive to grant budget
support is not aﬀected. However if donor i is self-biased, then such reallocation of recurrent
8costs will decrease the output from its own project and therefore, keeps it from providing
bi. In the case of untied budget support, aid proliferation occurs because part of its grant
will be used for other donors’ projects which the donor does not fully account for, leading
to lower levels of budget support in the equilibrium.
Finally, we elaborate the determination of bi. As clear from (17) and (18), the net
beneﬁt of reallocating one unit of donor i’s resources from ai to bi is fi























a is positive by assumption and the last term is negative. This shows that
the assumption of fi
x > fi
a does not guarantee a positive level of budget support. This is
because reallocation of resources from the aid to (tied) budget support aﬀects the recipient’s
behavior: a decrease in ai induces the recipient to reduce xi and moreover, an increase
in tied budget support also gives the recipient an incentive to reduce it further. Thus
the donors provide budget support only if fi







fxx+Mj , which is likely to occur when recurrent cost is suﬃciently scarce relative
to aid.
3.3 Tied budget support with discretion
The analyses above assume that the donors have no stages after the recipient determines the
amount of recurrent cost allocated to its project. This corresponds to the case in which the
donors can make precommitments to their decisions. Now we consider the case in which
the donors have discretion and can convert part of the aid investment to the recurrent
budget after the recipient decision of xi. For example, suppose donor i disbursed ai and
bi for a school project. However, after observing recurrent cost disbursed by the recipient
to be too small to eﬃciently operate the school due to lack of teachers and supplies, the
donor will have an incentive to convert part of ai to recurrent budget in order to pay wages
for teachers and required staﬀ. Formally, we consider a game which proceeds as follows:
• t = 1: Each donor decides ai and bi simultaneously.
• t = 2: The recipient determines (x1,...,xN) after observing (a1,...,aN) and (b1,...,bN).
• t = 3: Each donor can convert ti ≥ 0 from the aid investment to the recurrent budget
with per unit cost ϵi ≥ 0.
Let δi = 1 − ϵi. If the donor converts ti from the aid investment to the recurrent
budget, then the recurrent budget increases by δti. δi < 1 corresponds to the cases where
conversion of money from aid investment to recurrent budget incurs cost such as adminis-
trative procedure, replanning of the project and so on. As with the previous discussions,
we explicitly deal with the case of two donors, but all the analyses can be extended to the
9case of N donors with a minor change. At t = 3, the donor will determine the amount of
conversion ti ≥ 0 in order to maximize
f
i(ai − ti,xi + bi + δti) + λif
j(aj − tj,xj + bj + δtj)
+λig(K, ¯ X − x1 − x2) − ci(ai + bi).





x = 0. (20)
Let t∗
i denote the optimal conversion of aid. Condition (20) implies that t∗
i depends only
on xi and is unaﬀected by xj. Also note that if δi is small (or ϵ is large), t∗
i becomes zero.
We exclude such cases by assuming that ϵ is suﬃciently small.





2(a2−t2(x2),x2+b2+δt2(x2))+g(K, ¯ X −x1−x2)





x = gx, (21)
The recipient allocates its recurrent budget in order to equate its marginal productivities







2) = gx(K, ¯ X−x1−x2). Thus the marginal
productivities among the projects are not equalized at t = 2, when the conversion of
resources from the aid budget to the recurrent budget by the donors has not yet occurred.
Since the recipient expects donor i to convert t∗
i from the aid budget to the recurrent budget,
which reduces fi
x, the recipient invests more into its own domestic project: f1
x(a1,x1 +
b1), f2
x(a2,x2 + b2) > gx(K, ¯ X − x1 − x2).




i(ai − ti,xi + bi + δti) + λif
j(aj − tj,xj + bj + δtj)
+λig(K, ¯ X − x1 − x2) − ci(ai + bi).
The ﬁrst order conditions and (21) imply
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i = 0, and (22)
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xx < Ri < 0 and Mj < Mdisc
j < 0,4 we can derive
∂xi
∂ai > 0 and
∂xi
∂bi < 0.
We can show that if δi is close to 1, then the optimal bi approaches zero. That is, if a
donor can convert ai to recurrent cost without depreciation, then it does not precommit
the amount of budget support bi at t = 1. To see this, consider the extreme case of δi = 1.
Then the recipient’s optimization in (20) becomes fi
a = fi






















But (27) and (28) cannot be compatible since
∂xi
∂ai > 0 and
∂xi
∂bi < 0. The left hand side
of (27) expresses the marginal beneﬁt of increasing ai while that of (28) is the marginal
beneﬁt of increasing bi. These two expressions imply that by keeping ai + bi constant,
donor i can always gain additional beneﬁt by reducing bi and increasing ai. This argument
suggests that the donor would choose bi = 0. The optimal ai is determined by (27). The
logic behind this is as follows: since
∂xi
∂ai > 0 and
∂xi
∂bi < 0, the donor has an incentive to
allocate all resources toward the aid investment in order to attract the recipient’s recurrent
budget. 5




x = gx for all i ̸= j, the resource allocative
eﬃciency. On the other hand, (27) implies fi
a ̸= c′
i, that is, the technical eﬃciency cansnot
be achieved. Whether the total aid provided (ai + bi) or total output produces is larger
or smaller in the case of discretion than precommitment is ambiguous without specifying
functional forms.













4Ri < 0 is ensured by the assumption that faa > 0, fxx > 0 and faafxx − (fax)2 > 0. To see this,
substitute dti

















assumptions above imply Ri < 0.








for any positive value of bi, then bi is set to be zero. This condition
is derived by comparing the marginal beneﬁt of ai, fi
a + (1 − λi)fi
x
∂xi
∂ai, and that of bi, fi




11Proposition 5 If a donor can convert part of its aid to recurrent cost without deprecia-
tion, after the recipient allocating its recurrent budget, the resource allocative eﬃciency is
achieved but technical eﬃciency still cannot be obtained if λi < 1. If a donor’s conversion
of aid to recurrent cost incurs cost, then resource allocation eﬃciency is not ensured. The
comparison of total aid and total output between the case of precommitment and discretion
is ambiguous.
4 Conclusion
Recent empirical studies reveal that eﬀectiveness of aid on growth is ambiguous. This
paper considered aid proliferation as potential cause that undermines aid eﬀectiveness.
While aid proliferation has attracted practioneers and researchers attention to harm aid
eﬀectiveness through raising transaction costs, this paper sheds light on it’s common pool
property and that too many aid (projects) and donors will reduce the amount of recurrent
cost allocated to each aid projects. Since aid projects can only produce beneﬁts sustainably
when suﬃcient recurrent costs are suitably disbursed with investment, shortage of recurrent
cost will result in low aid productivity.
Based on a simple model that incorporates aid and recurrent costs as complements to
produce development and growth, we showed that optimal allocation of aid and recurrent
cost can not be achieved in general because donors and recipient allocate aid and recurrent
cost separately, and their opportunity costs are diﬀerent in general. Donor’s budget support
or programme aid can be a potential device to supplement the shortage of recipient’s
recurrent cost and to alleviate the misallocation of inputs. However, when the donors are
self-biased, budget support induces aid proliferation because it crowds out the recipient’s
recurrent budget or substitutes it to other donors, and therefore causes underprovision of
budget support relative to aid. Moreover, aid proliferation is shown to be worse with more
donors.
The budget support in our model can be interpreted as any support by the donor to
supplement the shortage of recipient’s resources. For example, the recipient’s resource may
be “governance” or “capacity” and the donor’s support can be “capacity building”. These
supports can be understood as a voluntary provision of public goods. The essence is that as
long as the recipient’s complementary domestic resources have the nature of common-pool-
resources, donor’s (voluntary) support would be underprovided whenever donors are not
fully altruistic, which is well-known in the public good literature. Adding exclusion of other
donors and the recipient from consuming the donor’s support, as in the case of tied budget
support, can not mitigate the problem when the recipient can divert its budget. So, our
model can be seen as an application of the voluntary provision of public goods literature
to the context of foreign aid and budget support, while Knack and Rahman (2007) is an
application of the problem of common-pool-resource or the “tragedy of the commons”.
Several further studies are required to deepen our understanding on aid eﬀectiveness.
We have assumed that shortage of recurrent cost relative to aid investment undermines
aid eﬀectiveness but this needs to be conﬁrmed empirically. A possible way to test this is
12to run a aid-growth regression including the ratio of average aid per donor to recipient’s
revenue as one of the explanatory variables. Moreover, our theory predicts that aid/revenue
ratio increases with more donors. It may also be interesting to check this, taking in to
consideration that numbers of donors may be endogenous so that one needs to identify
whether an increase of aid/revenue ratio is caused by donor competition or by recipient
characteristics (fragile countries may be aid-dependent).
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